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The integration of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) into the National Airspace 
System (NAS) poses a variety of technical challenges to UAS developers and 
aviation regulators. In response to growing demand for access to civil airspace in 
the United States, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has produced a 
roadmap identifying key areas requiring further research and development. One 
such technical challenge is the development of a “detect and avoid” system (DAA) 
capable of providing a means of compliance with the “see and avoid” requirement 
in manned aviation. The purpose of the DAA system is to support the pilot, 
situated at a ground control station (GCS), in maintaining “DAA well clear” of 
nearby aircraft through the use of GCS displays and alerts. In addition to its 
primary function of aiding the pilot in maintaining well clear, the DAA system 
must also safely interoperate with existing NAS systems and operations, such as 
the airspace management procedures of air traffic controllers (ATC) and Collision 
Avoidance (CA) systems currently in use by manned aircraft, namely the Traffic 
alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) II. It is anticipated that many UAS 
architectures will integrate both a DAA system and a TCAS II. It is therefore 
necessary to explicitly study the integration of DAA and TCAS II alerting 
structures and maneuver guidance formats to ensure that pilots understand the 
appropriate type and urgency of their response to the various alerts. This paper 
presents a concept of interoperability for the two systems. The concept was 
developed with the goal of avoiding any negative impact on the performance level 
of TCAS II while retaining a DAA system that still effectively enables pilots to 
maintain DAA well clear.  
 
The interoperability concept described in the paper focuses primarily on 
facilitating the transition from a late-stage DAA encounter (where a loss of well 
clear is imminent) to a TCAS II Corrective Resolution Advisory (RA), which 
requires pilot compliance within five seconds of its issuance. The interoperability 
concept was presented to 10 participants (6 active UAS pilots and 4 active 
commercial pilots) in a medium-fidelity, human-in-the-loop simulation designed to 
stress different aspects of the DAA and TCAS II systems. Pilots’ ability to 
maintain separation, their rate of compliance and response times using the 
interoperability concept are reported. Results indicated that pilots exhibited 
comprehension of, and appropriate prioritization within, the DAA-TCAS II 
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combined alert structure. Pilots demonstrated a high rate of compliance with TCAS 
II RAs and were also seen to respond to corrective RAs within the five second 
requirement established for manned aircraft. The DAA system presented under test 
was also shown to be effective in supporting pilots’ ability to maintain DAA well 
clear in the overwhelming majority of cases in which pilots had sufficient time to 
respond. 
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Human Systems Integration
• Detect and Avoid (DAA) is a means of compliance with Title 14 Code of 
Federal Regulations (14CFR) Part 91, which dictate:
– Pilot is ultimately responsible for practicing vigilance to avoid collision hazards
• This authority includes the right to deviate while flying Instrument Flight Rules (IFR)
– Pilot applies their own judgement as to whether there is a violation of well 
clear 
• When quantifying well clear for Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) 
operations (i.e., “DAA Well Clear”), existing systems had to be taken into 
account:
– Air traffic management – undesirable to disrupt current flows/procedures
– Collision avoidance systems – need to avoid triggering excessive collision 
avoidance maneuvers on UAS and manned aircraft
Background
• Multiple classes of UAS are defined by the Phase 1 Minimum Operational 
Performance Standards (MOPS) for UAS DAA systems (developed by RTCA 
SC-228)
– Class 1 = UAS equipped with active airborne surveillance (e.g., Mode S), ADS-B 
In, and an air-to-air RADAR (ATAR)
• Enables DAA operations – alerts/guidance to maintain & regain DAA well clear
• Minimum equipage 
– Class 2 = Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS II) (+ DAA)
• Enables Collision Avoidance (CA) operations – alerts/guidance to avoid collision
• CA maneuvers are coordinated with other TCAS II-equipped aircraft
• Optional equipage
v The integration of TCAS II and DAA in a Class 2 system requires substantial 
investigation since they rely on different assumptions and capabilities
Background
• DAA System
– Protects against all intruder types (cooperative & non-cooperative)
– Issues caution and warning-level alerts and guidance in order to remain/regain 
DAA well clear 
• Issues a caution-level ‘preventive’ alert against traffic that is safely separated but close 
enough to warrant an alert (i.e., do not climb/descend into the traffic)
– Suggestive guidance issued to help pilots determine how to remain/regain DAA 
well clear
• Displayed as ‘banding’ that highlights headings/altitudes to avoid in order to maintain 
DAA well clear
• Regain DAA well clear guidance shows ‘wedge’ of headings/altitudes to target when 
loss of well clear is unavoidable
Background
Regain Well Clear GuidanceHeading Bands Altitude Bands
• TCAS II System
– Protects against cooperative intruders only (i.e., 
equipped with Mode C/S)
– Issues caution-level alerts (Traffic Advisories, TAs) and 
warning-level alerts (Resolution Advisories, RAs)
• TAs aid the pilot in acquiring the traffic visually in 
anticipation of an RA
• RAs can be both Preventive (i.e., “do not climb/descend”) 
and Corrective (“climb/descend”)
– Directive vertical rate guidance accompanies all RAs -
expectation that pilot will comply within 5s
Background
Vertical Rate 
Guidance
• A DAA-TCAS Interoperability Workshop was held at NASA Ames Research 
Center to discuss issues and potential solutions regarding integration
– Members of SC-228 and the TCAS Program Office were in attendance
• Primary issues confronting a Class 2 system are:
– Detection of intruders
• In order to generate Resolution Advisories the intruder must have a transponder with 
altitude reports (e.g., Mode C or S)
• Possible for RAs to be in the direction of non-cooperative traffic
– Alerting structures & maneuver guidance
• Both the TCAS and DAA systems include different caution and warning-level alerting 
that could be perceived as contradictory
• DAA maneuver guidance is not coordinated with TCAS maneuver guidance –
particularly important with guidance to regain DAA well clear
• Could lead to confusion and/or frustration
Background
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• DAA-TCAS Interoperability Concept:
– General TCAS II modifications:
• Corrective RAs will always be presented to pilots, and the expectation will always be 
for pilots to comply with the guidance (ideally within 5sec)
• Preventive RAs (i.e., “Do not climb/descend”) presented as Preventive DAA alerts 
• Traffic Advisories (TAs) will be suppressed, and replaced by DAA alerts and guidance
– General DAA modifications:
• Maintain use of 2 different warning-level alerts (one for DAA and one for TCAS II) 
• Vertical guidance to regain DAA well clear is suppressed for cooperative intruders
– During an active TCAS II Corrective RA, the DAA system shall:
• Remove the RA intruder from calculation of horizontal DAA guidance
• Fully suppress vertical DAA guidance
• Issue guidance to regain DAA well clear if a secondary, non-cooperative intruder 
triggers a DAA warning alert
v Characterize pilot & system performance with interoperability concept 
developed at workshop
Background
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• Participants:
– 6 active duty UAS pilots
• Average Age: 36 
• Manned Flying Experience Total Hours: 1600
• Unmanned Flying Experience Total Hours: 1400
– 4 commercial pilots
• Average Age: 30
• Manned Flying Experience Total Hours: 9000
• Simulation Hardware/Software:
– Vigilant Spirit Control Station (VSCS) served as ground control station (GCS)
• Displayed DAA and TCAS alerting and guidance
• Vehicle controls
– TCAS II v 7.0 logic (with 7.1 aural alerts)
– Java Architecture for DAA and Extensibility (JADEM; developed at NASA Ames) 
served as experimental DAA System
• Perfect surveillance data (no uncertainty models applied)
Experimental Design
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Experimental Design
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Symbol Name Pilot Action Buffered Well Clear Criteria
Time to Loss of Well 
Clear
Aural Alert
Verbiage
TCAS RA
• Immediate action required
• Comply with RA sense and vertical rate
• Notify ATC as soon as practicable after 
taking action
*DMOD = 0.55 nmi
*ZTHR = 600 ft
*modTau = 25 sec
0 sec (+/- 5 sec)
(TCPA approximate:
25 sec)
“Climb/Desc
end”
4
Self Separation 
Warning Alert
• Immediate action required
• Notify ATC as soon as practicable after 
taking action
DMOD = 0.75 nmi
HMD = 0.75 nmi
ZTHR = 450 ft
modTau = 35 sec
25 sec
(TCPA approximate: 
60 sec)
“Traffic, 
Maneuver
Now”
3
Corrective Self 
Separation Alert
• On current course, corrective action 
required
• Coordinate with ATC to determine an 
appropriate maneuver
DMOD = 0.75 nmi
HMD  = 0.75 nmi
ZTHR = 450 ft
modTau = 35 sec
55 sec
(TCPA approximate: 
90 sec)
“Traffic,
Avoid”
2
Preventive Self 
Separation Alert
• On current course, corrective action
should not be required
• Monitor for intruder course changes
• Talk with ATC if desired
DMOD = 0.75 nmi
HMD = 1.0 nmi
ZTHR = 700 ft
modTau = 35 sec
55 sec
(TCPA approximate: 
90 sec)
“Traffic, 
Monitor”
1
Self Separation 
Proximate Alert
• Monitor target for potential increase in 
threat level
DMOD = 0.75 nmi
HMD = 1.5 nmi
ZTHR = 1200 ft
modTau = 35s
85 sec
(TCPA approximate: 
120 sec)
N/A
0 None (Target) • No action expected Within surveillance
field of regard
X N/A
* These values show the Protection Volume (not well clear volume) at MSL 5000-10000ft (TCAS Sensitivity Level 5)
Experimental Design
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Cooperative Aircraft
Symbol Name Aural AlertVerbiage
TCAS RA “Climb/Descend”
4
DAA Warning 
Alert
“Traffic, 
Maneuver Now”
3
Corrective DAA 
Alert
“Traffic, Avoid”
2
Preventive DAA 
& RA
“Traffic, Monitor”
0 None (Target) N/A
Non-Cooperative Aircraft
Symbol Name Aural AlertVerbiage
4
DAA Warning 
Alert
“Traffic, 
Maneuver Now”
3
Corrective DAA 
Alert
“Traffic, Avoid”
2
Preventive DAA
& RA
“Traffic, Monitor”
0 None (Target) N/A

• Test set up:
– Pilots flew a simulated MQ-9 on straight flight path
• No secondary tasks or background traffic
• Researcher served as ATC confederate
– 4 60-minute experimental trials
• 16 encounters per trial (~1 encounter every 4min)
– Encounters were designed to conform to 4 specific use cases designed to stress 
specific aspects of the interoperability concept
– Encounters within each use case were flown in 2 different ways:
• Non-Blunder – nominal case; the intruder was scripted to result in use case from the 
get-go, i.e., pilot had full alert timeline to resolve before use case would occur
• Blunder – intruder was scripted to make a last-second maneuver into the UAS to force 
the purpose of the use case
Experimental Design

Use Cases
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Multi-Threat Use Case # Intruder Type(s) Purpose
No
1 Non-cooperative Generate guidance to regain DWC
2 Cooperative Generate TCAS II RA
Yes
3 Cooperative & Non-cooperative
Generate secondary DAA warning alert 
with non-cooperative intruder following 
compliance with TCAS II RA
4 Cooperative & Non-cooperative
Generate secondary corrective DAA alert 
with non-cooperative intruder following 
compliance with TCAS II RA
• How often did an intruder lose DAA well clear and/or trigger a TCAS RA?
– As function of blunder vs. non-blunder
– As function of primary vs. secondary intruder
• When a loss of DAA well clear or an RA occurred:
– Did pilots comply with the guidance to regain well clear and/or TCAS II RA 
guidance?
– Reasons for non-compliance
• What were pilot response times?
– As function of blunder vs. non-blunder
– Did response to TCAS RA approach 5sec requirement?
Research Questions
• Separation
– Loss of DAA Well Clear (LoDWC) Proportion = instances of DAA well clear / total 
DAA Corrective or Warning alerts
– TCAS II Corrective RA Proportion = instances of Corrective RAs / total 
encounters designed to generate Corrective RA
• Compliance
– Regain DAA Well Clear Guidance Compliance Proportion = instances of 
compliance / total number of issuances 
– TCAS II RA Guidance Compliance Proportion = instances of compliance / total 
number of Corrective Ras
• Response Time
– Initial Response Time = time to start input into GCS following alert
– Initial Edit Time = time to complete input into GCS 
– Aircraft Response Time = initial response + initial edit time
Metrics
RESULTS
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Results
• The rate of separation violations was overwhelmingly determined by the 
encounter type (non-blunder vs. blunder)
– Almost no separation violations occurred against non-blundering traffic 
• 3 total losses of DAA well clear; 1 TCAS II Corrective RA
– As expected, almost all primary blunder encounters resulted in a loss of DWC or 
an RA
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• Losses of DWC in Non-Blunder Encounters
– 1 case of pilot returning to course too soon after having successfully resolved it 
initially (occurred in Use Case 2)
– 2 cases of pilots having difficulty interpreting the DAA alerting and guidance (1 
each in Use Cases 3 & 4)
• Secondary conflict in Blunder Encounters
– 38 of 39 instances of loss of DWC with secondary intruder occurred in Use Case 
3 (secondary threat was a warning alert)
• Pilots nearly completely avoided losses of DWC with secondary threat when intruder 
was a corrective (Use Case 4)
– Pilots frequently avoided a conflict with the secondary aircraft entirely by 
making horizontal maneuver in addition to complying with TCAS II RA
Results
• Compliance
– Nearly perfect compliance with both 
regain DAA well clear & RA guidance
• 97% (296/304) of the time pilots 
complied with guidance to regain DAA 
well clear
• 96% (225/235) of the time pilots 
complied with TCAS II RA guidance
Results
Yes
96%
No
4%
Overall Compliance w/ Guidance
• Non-compliance
– Regain DAA well clear guidance - most common was pilots had already 
initiated a maneuver in a different direction and felt a second maneuver was 
unnecessary
– TCAS II RA guidance – most common reason was pilot (apparently) being 
aware of secondary traffic in direction of the RA (all Use Case 3)
• 6 instances where pilot maneuvered in the opposite sense as RA
• 3 instances where pilots only made a horizontal maneuver
• Response Time
– Pilots were consistently faster responding to blunder encounters
• Due to faster initial responses rather than edit times
• Previous simulation had avg. aircraft response times of 22.75sec & 10.43sec
– Pilots also shown to consistently respond faster to TCAS II Corrective RAs 
compared to DAA Warning alerts
• Consistent with instructions/training
Results
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v Interoperability concept under test shown to support both the basic DAA 
functionality under nominal conditions (non-blunder encounters) and 
compliance with DAA and RA guidance
• Losses of DAA well clear & Corrective RAs rare under nominal conditions
– Pilots proved able to de-conflict from secondary intruders – despite being in 
close proximity
• Pilots complied with regain DAA well clear and RA guidance at very high 
rate
– Less likely to comply with RAs in cases where secondary traffic (undetected by 
TCAS) would cause an immediate conflict (Use Case 3)
– Response times to TCAS II RAs within 5sec requirement
v Caveat: the design of the study - no secondary tasks or background traffic, 
high rate of conflicts – likely led to better and more efficient performance 
than could possible be expected in more representative setting
Conclusions
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